Expected climate change consequences and their role in explaining individual risk judgments

potentially negative impacts [e.g., 2–4]. One obstacle to public engagement is that people tend to perceive climate change as a threat that will mostly affect spatially distant places [5–7]. Because of this, people’s assessments of how negative the effects of climate change will be on their respective countries are likely to differ from their general worry about climate change. The present study sets out to explore unprompted responses when people are asked about their expectations regarding the consequences of climate change for their own country, in addition to exploring if an emphasis on specific consequences contributes to explaining differ- ences in individual risk judgments. While several studies have investigated the public’s under- standing of the climate system, these have mainly focused on identifying prevailing misconceptions rather than studying how subjective conceptions about climate-related events may shape risk judgments [e.g., 8–10]. Bo¨hm and Pfister [11] propose that people’s mental representation of environmental risks can be described with a multi-level framework focusing on the risks’ causal structure. The framework includes five consecutive ‘levels’, spanning from attitudes and goals to human activities, emissions and pollution, environmental changes, and finally impacts on humans. A societal-level example of this structure is how a desire for economic growth can lead to contin- ued oil and gas production, which leads to carbon dioxide emissions, causing increased climate

change-induced flooding incidents, and resulting in damage to buildings. The five levels are assumed to be circular; that is, people’s motives and goals form the basis for certain actions (e.g., driving by car, adopting certain technologies); the consequences of these actions harm the environment, which leads to impacts on humans. Experiencing these impacts might create new motives and goals, for example towards adaptive or mitigative actions. Consequently, changes in attitudes and goals can be conceptualized as both a cause for human activities and a consequence of experienced impacts. The depicted framework is based on Hohenemser, Kas- person and Kates’ [12] conceptualization of the causal structure of hazard control, which understands environmental risks as a causal chain of events and assumes that the chain can be blocked by exerting control in the transitions between levels. The subjective conception of climate-related events, and specifically simplified cognitive representations of causes and consequences, are central for climate change risk perception [13]. Hence, we anticipate that expected climate change consequences will relate to people’s general worry about climate change and their evaluation of how negative climate change will be for their own country. Previous research has found that people tend to mention conse- quences related to emissions and pollution (e.g., air pollution), and environmental changes (e.g., ozone depletion) when asked about what they consider to be global environmental risks

[14]. Expectations of possible negative consequences for humans are believed to be a core char- acteristic of why people identify a given phenomenon as a risk and report higher levels of emo- tions such as worry [11]. However, human activities might be perceived as somewhat controllable and therefore seen as less of a risk [15]. We take an explorative approach to inves- tigate the relationship between what people believe will be the most important impact of cli- mate change on their country and their risk judgments. In addition to possible differences in the content laypeople emphasize, causal beliefs can also differ concerning their underlying structure [see e.g., 16–18]. In line with this, we will look at how mentioning impacts across (or within) each level is related to individual risk judgments. Although the consequences of climate change will be mostly negative across the world, vul- nerability towards specific impacts can differ both between countries and between groups within a country [1]. Further, risk perception is to some extent socially constructed, depending on social, cultural, economic, and political influences [19]. Given that risks are (partly) socially constructed, the same risk can be evaluated differently at different times, in different places, and by different groups. Support for this is provided by research demonstrating cross-national PLOS ONE Expected climate change consequences and individual risk judgments PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281258 February 15, 2023 2 / 15 Research Council [NFR; project number 244904],

under the cooperation agreement between Statoil and the University of Bergen [Akademiaavtale; project number 803589], and by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research [grant number 01UV1403]. The fieldwork was outsourced and administered by the social research company Ipsos Mori. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.