The Five Canadas of Climate Change: Using audience segmentation to inform communication on climate policy

and colleagues [15] describe this segment as individuals who believe in climate change but who tend see it as a distant problem, hence not feeling the urgency to take action. In the spring of 2015, the Pew Research Center reported that, while Canadians and Americans expressed rel- atively high levels of concern about climate change (64% vs. 59%), the latter were considerably less likely than the former to believe that climate change is harming people around the world now (41% vs. 56%) [76]. To some extent, the absence of a Cautious segment in Canada reflects these differences in risk perceptions. These differences notwithstanding, our results are similar to existing studies using climate change audience segmentation techniques, which demonstrate the predictive power of audi- ence segments relative to demographics and other political variables found to be important correlates of climate policy support in the literature [4]. Explaining 26% of the variance in atti- tudes toward carbon pricing, the predictive power of our segmentation is consistent with pre- vious studies [12, 15] where audience membership explained between 14% and 55% of the variance in responses to climate change. In terms of the overall impact of messages on climate policy attitudes, we found that both the “Invest in solutions” and “Relative price” messages had, across the sample as a whole, a positive impact on carbon pricing attitudes when policy stringency was higher. This result ech- oes previous experimental evidence of framing effects found in other studies. For instance, Bei-

das in very different–and sometimes unintended–ways. The “Invest in solutions” and the “Rel- ative price” messages had a negative impact on attitudes toward carbon taxes among the Alarmed when policy stringency was low, and a positive impact on attitudes among the Con- cerned when policy stringency was higher. While all messages were effective with the Con- cerned, the “Relative price” was the only message positively affecting both the Concerned and the Doubtful. These findings echo recent research looking at the role of political variables in moderating the effect of carbon tax design on levels of policy support, which found heteroge- nous sub-group effects across individuals with different political ideologies [52] and partisan identities [56, 77]. However, these studies focused specifically on revenue recycling options (e.g., tax rebates, deficit reduction, support for renewable energy technology) and used unidi- mensional segmentation criteria. In contrast, we examined information provision and relative price effects using broader seg- mentation criteria, and showed that communicating around the specific consequences of car- bon taxes for the price of essential goods (like energy) may be more effective than PLOS ONE The Five Canadas of Climate Change PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273977 November 23, 2022 15 / 21

communicating around policy design, especially among less engaged audiences (i.e., the Con- cerned and Doubtful segments). That these framing effects were mostly found among moder- ately engaged groups echoes Zaller’s [78] two-moderator model of persuasion, and is in line with research by Chong and Druckman [79] highlighting the role of strongly held prior atti- tudes in moderating framing effects. Both of these studies suggest that framing effects are most likely to be found among audiences with relatively weaker opinions. A negative effect of the “Invest in solutions” and “Relative price” messages among the Alarmed is also broadly consistent with previous studies documenting “boomerang effects”, occurring when exposure to a given message moves beliefs in a direction opposed to the origi- nal intent [39, 80]. However, in contrast to these studies–which typically found boomerang effects among groups that were more skeptical of climate change—our results demonstrate that boomerang effects may also occur among the most Alarmed segments of the population. This result among the Alarmed could be explained by the relative sophistication of this audience. Recall that of all segments, the Alarmed are most engaged with climate change and are much more likely than national averages to report being both knowledgeable about the cli- mate change issue, and very interested in politics. As a result, the Alarmed may be more moti- vated by accuracy goals and to scrutinize the credibility of messages, thus making them less

inclined to believe that such a low (2 cents per litre) carbon price can have any real impact on green infrastructure or the relative price of different energy technologies [c.f., 3]. To test this explanation, we created a dummy variable equal to 1 for respondents who received the "Invest in solutions" or the "Relative price" treatment (i.e., those with a negatively signed coefficient at a low price stringency) and 0 for those who received the "Equal dividend" treatment. We then examined whether these treatments had a different effect on perceptions of policy effective- ness, and whether policy stringency moderated this effect. As shown in the S4 Table in S1 File, we found a negative interaction effect between the "Invest in solutions" and the "Relative price" messages and the level of policy stringency. Consistent with the idea that the Alarmed are more sophisticated and therefore more likely to scrutinize the coherence of carbon pricing messages, we found that messages alluding to substantial earmarking or leveling the playing field for alternative energy sources decreased perceptions of policy effectiveness among the Alarmed, but only under the lower price treatment. Overall, our results suggest that attempts at devising uniform, one-size-fits-all communica- tion strategies around climate policy are likely to face important challenges. For instance, our findings suggest that governments and communicators should be careful when communicat- ing with more sophisticated and engaged climate change audiences (like the Alarmed), who

may be more motivated by accuracy goals when processing messages around climate change. As a result, careful consideration ought to be given to the credibility of messages, so as not to alienate more engaged audiences as they seek to win the support of less engaged groups. More broadly, the different framing effects found at different levels of policy stringency further sug- gest that the overall cost structure is important when crafting messages about climate policy. As the costs of climate policy and concerns with cost of living evolve over time, communica- tions may need to be adapted so they better fit the context in which messages are received, while meeting the informational needs and motivations of different audiences. Conclusions Analyzing data from a random probability survey of adult Canadians collected in October 2017, this study examined how unique audience segments within the Canadian population think and act toward climate change and explored whether and how the level of audience engagement moderates the effect of various messages on support for climate policy. We found PLOS ONE The Five Canadas of Climate Change PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273977 November 23, 2022 16 / 21

that the Canadian population can be divided into five distinct segments, offering potential tar- gets for climate change communication: the Alarmed (25%), Concerned (45%), Disengaged (5%), Doubtful (17%) and Dismissive (8%). These audiences reacted to emphasis framing in very different—and sometimes unintended—ways. In particular, “Invest in solutions” and “Relative price” messages had a negative impact on attitudes toward carbon taxes among more engaged audiences (i.e., the Alarmed) when policy stringency was low, and a positive impact on attitudes among the Concerned when policy stringency was higher. The “Relative price” was the only message positively affecting both the Concerned and the Doubtful, suggesting that communicating around the specific consequences of carbon taxes for the prices of essen- tial goods (like energy) may be a fruitful way to broaden support for carbon pricing among moderately engaged audiences. This may particularly be important as the costs of climate pol- icy rise as well as in contexts where cost of living considerations are top of mind. In extending findings from the audience segmentation literature to the Canadian case, and by exploring how each segment responds to different messages about carbon taxes, our study helps better understand heterogeneity in Canadian attitudes toward climate change as well as the potential promise and pitfalls involved when attempting to communicate about a contro- versial policy across a broad range of differently engaged audience segments. In this sense, our

study contributes to the literature on climate change policy and communication by highlight- ing the importance of audience-based data in supporting climate research, policy and commu- nication and offering a starting point for further work aimed at developing messages that speak to different climate change audiences. While exploratory in nature, our analysis is limited in a number of important respects. First, our findings are based on a relatively small sample of the five audience groups. In analyz- ing how these audiences respond to the treatments tested in our experiment, we had to rely on a small number of observations. Caution should be exercised when interpreting these results, notably for segments for which we have the smallest samples (i.e., Disengaged and Dismissive audiences). The null results reported in this analysis might reflect a lack of statistical power, particularly for these smaller audiences. In order to detect medium-sized effects with a power of 80% and an alpha level of 0.05, it would require a sample of 179 respondents in each audi- ence segment. Given that this is the first segmentation study of its kind for Canada, it was diffi- cult to anticipate the size of the audiences a priori. While we were able to meet this threshold for three segments (i.e., the Alarmed, Concerned and Doubtful), more research with larger samples would be required to determine the effectiveness of different frames across all audi- ences. For instance, future research could use data available from social media platforms as an

exciting (and less costly) research possibility to classify climate change audiences from larger samples. Second, our analysis provided a high-resolution portrait of attitudes toward climate change at one specific point in time, offering little insight into the evolution of climate opinions and audiences, as well as limited information on the durability of the observed framing effects. Many things have changed since 2017 in terms of national and international discourses on cli- mate change, likely bringing about changes in the composition of the segments. For instance, the Six America’s studies in the United States documented a clear trend toward rising Alarm in the United States [81]. Although we can only speculate as to whether Canada followed a similar trend, our study provides a baseline against which future research can be compared. Other studies could replicate this segmentation using longitudinal data to provide a more dynamic picture of Canadian attitudes towards climate change. Finally, there are other impor- tant messages, and other factors that may condition messaging effects that were not included in this analysis, such as the source of the message and the availability of competing frames or arguments, which we leave for future work. PLOS ONE The Five Canadas of Climate Change PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273977 November 23, 2022 17 / 21

Building on this work, future analyses might go further and examine patterns of informa- tion behaviours and media use across audiences. Our study also calls for more research on cli- mate change audiences using different types of research designs, including longitudinal analyses. Future research might also examine whether and how the source of the message influences messaging effects among different audiences and explore how the latter respond to frames as they compete with each other. These kinds of extensions will help to further our col- lective understanding of how messages interact with different audience characteristics, provid- ing more insight into what to consider when attempting to communicate about controversial policies with a heterogeneous public. Supporting information S1 File. (DOCX) Author Contributions Conceptualization: Marjolaine Martel-Morin, Erick Lachapelle. Formal analysis: Marjolaine Martel-Morin. Funding acquisition: Erick Lachapelle. Investigation: Erick Lachapelle. Methodology: Marjolaine Martel-Morin, Erick Lachapelle. Visualization: Marjolaine Martel-Morin. Writing – original draft: Marjolaine Martel-Morin, Erick Lachapelle. Writing – review & editing: Marjolaine Martel-Morin, Erick Lachapelle. References 1. Kunh D, Lao J. Effects of evidence on attitudes: is polarization the norm? Psych Sci 1996; 7:115–120. 2. Lord CG, Ross L, Lepper MR. Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theo- ries on Subsequently Considered Evidence. J of Pers and Soc Psych 1979; 11:2098–2109.

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