Australian voters’ attitudes to climate action and their social-political determinants

Projecting further into the future shows more pronounced change, and greater differences between the scenarios. To the extent of our analysis (following availability of ABS population projection data), in 2064 our analysis indicates we would see 63% of the population consider- ing GHG emissions reduction to be ‘extremely important’ if 2019’s young people are indicative of future young people and cohorts did not change their respective views over time. If, however, future young people hold views stronger than 2019’s young people, in line with age-related patterns of opinion observed in 2019, then by 2064 our analysis indicates 69–72% of the population may consider GHG emissions reduction ‘extremely important’ (69% based on projections excluding the 93+ age group from the slope, 72% with the 93+ age group included). Discussion Our analysis of climate change opinion data in the context of the May 2019 Australian federal election shows a large majority of voters feel that it is important for Australia to reduce green- house gas emissions. However, how important is action on climate change is consistently affected by political party preference and educational attainment. We found that progressive voters (Greens and Labor) were consistently more likely than conservative voters (Liberal, Nationals, and Liberal-National Party) to 1) think climate action is extremely important, 2) have considered climate change in their voting decision at the 2019 federal election, and 3) to be willing to incur a personal cost to address climate change. In addition, higher levels of edu-

cational attainment predicted the same pattern, but to a lesser magnitude. These findings indicate that the Australian population, in aggregate, will support climate action. This is the case, too, for the expansion of renewable energy in Australia’s energy mix. Although divisions along lines of political party affiliation remain potent [e.g. 4, 5], these divi- sions are mostly in the degree of support for climate action, not categorical terms of support or opposition. Our findings also suggest that we can expect the proportion of the Australian population which considers climate action to be important or decisive will increase into the future, given that younger voters exhibit stronger support for reducing emissions, reflecting the findings of recent research by Tranter [53]. However, our findings indicate that the change that is set to arise purely from demography is slow. Assuming that cohorts retain their attitudes through time, a population ageing scenario suggests that strong support for climate action would increase by about four percentage points over the coming decade as younger voters replace the old. Hence, a large and rapid change in attitudes of the population overall would require exist- ing voting-age people to change their mind. This appears to be happening. Comparing our results to an existing Australian longitudinal study of Australian public opinion on climate change [17] suggests that support for climate action over the last six years rose by two percent- age points per year, about four times faster than would be expected on the basis of demo-

graphic change alone. The fact that age is highly significant in univariate analysis, but loses significance due to high covariance with political party preference suggests there is an age cohort divide on climate change opinion in Australia that coincides with differing party political attitudes between older and younger voters [53]. This in turn raises the question of whether we are seeing the emergence of a new generation expressing strong pro-climate action and progressive political attitudes that will persist over time. Evidence from studies of voting behaviour and social change would support such an interpretation, particularly due to the influence of social-politi- cal events during early adulthood in shaping enduring attitudes [56–62]. But, such questions PLOS ONE Australian voters’ attitudes to climate action and their social-political determinants PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248268 March 24, 2021 13 / 18