Repetition increases belief in climate-skeptical claims, even for climate science endorsers

Supporting information S1 File. Materials in Experiments 1 and 2: Scales and claims. (DOCX) S2 File. Linear mixed effects models in Experiments 1 and 2 with belief as covariate. (DOCX) S3 File. Experiment 1 dataset. (XLSX) S4 File. Experiment 2 dataset. (XLSX) S1 Fig. Mean truth ratings for repeated and non-repeated skeptic-aligning claims in Exper- iment 1. Note: large error bars are due to comparisons being between-subjects. (TIF) S2 Fig. Mean truth ratings for repeated and non-repeated skeptic-aligning claims in Exper- iment 2. Note: large error bars are due to 95% CI comparisons being between-subjects and hence each bar has a lower N. (TIF) S3 Fig. Estimated mean truth ratings across repetition (repeated, non-repeated) and sub- jective claim type (science-aligning, skeptic-aligning) in Experiment 2. (TIF) S4 Fig. Estimated mean truth ratings across repetition (repeated, non-repeated) and claim Type (science-aligning, skeptic-aligning) for alarmed group in Experiment 2. (TIF) Author Contributions Conceptualization: Yangxueqing Jiang, Norbert Schwarz, Katherine J. Reynolds, Eryn J. Newman. Data curation: Yangxueqing Jiang. Formal analysis: Yangxueqing Jiang, Eryn J. Newman. Investigation: Yangxueqing Jiang. Methodology: Yangxueqing Jiang, Eryn J. Newman. Resources: Katherine J. Reynolds, Eryn J. Newman. Software: Yangxueqing Jiang. Supervision: Norbert Schwarz, Eryn J. Newman. Visualization: Yangxueqing Jiang, Eryn J. Newman. Writing – original draft: Yangxueqing Jiang, Eryn J. Newman. Writing – review & editing: Yangxueqing Jiang, Norbert Schwarz, Katherine J. Reynolds,

Eryn J. Newman. References 1. Brashier NM, Eliseev ED, Marsh EJ. An initial accuracy focus prevents illusory truth. Cognition. 2020 Jan 1; 194:104054. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104054 PMID: 31473395 PLOS ONE Illusory truth effect for climate-skeptical claims PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0307294 August 7, 2024 16 / 19